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INTRODUCTION 
There are three major currents in semantic theory these days. First there is what Chierchia [1990] 
aptly calls "what is alive of classical Montague semantics". Secondly, there is Discourse 
Representation Theory. Thirdly, there is Situation Semantics. Each of these three branches of 
formal semantics has its own specialities and its particular focuses of interest. Each can boast of 
its own successes. Thus Montague semantics models the Fregean building block theory of 
meaning in a particularly elegant way, gives a unified account of the semantics of noun phrases 
as generalized quantifiers and a natural but sophisticated treatment of coordination phenomena. 
Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), on the other hand, treats different kinds of anaphora 
succesfully, extends the field of operation of semantic theory to the level of texts, handles 
Geach's so-called 'donkey' sentences in a convincing way and generally deepens our 
understanding of semantics by its insistence on the dynamic rather than static nature of meaning. 
Situation Semantics, lastly, emphasizes the partial character of meaning and information and is 
very much focussed on the contextual dependance oflanguage. The theory gives a nice treatment 
of the semantics of perception verbs (see Barwise [ 1981]) and an interesting new approach to the 
Liar paradox (Barwise & Etchemendy [ 198 7]). 
Unfortunately there is no single semantic framework in which all these niceties can be com-
bined and although the three semantic theories are historically connected (all three derive from 
Richard Montague's pioneering work) and each claims to be a formal, m~thematical theory of 
meaning, it is difficult to compare the three theories due to the diverging technical setups. It is 
hard to find a position from which all three can be viewed simultaneously and it should be noted 
that each is lacking in the sense that it cannot explain or copy all successes of the others. 
What is needed, clearly, is a synthesis, and indeed some work has been done that goes in the 
direction of a unified theory of semantics. So, for example, Barwise [1987] compares 
Montague's [1973) generalized quantifier model of natural language quantification, further devel-
oped in Barwise & Cooper [1981], with the approach taken in Barwise & Perry (1983]. Rooth 
[ 1987) takes Barwise's paper as a starting point and gives a Montague style fragment of English 
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that embodies a version of the Heim I Kamp theory. Groenendijk and Stokhof [ 1990) develop a 
Montagovian version of Discourse Representation Theory as well, calling it 'Dynamic Montague 
Grammar' (DMG), while Muskens [1989a, 1989b), to give a fourth example, shows that an im-
portant feature of Situation Semantics-partiality-is compatible with Montague's type theoretic 
approach to semantics and that the Situation Semantic analyses of perception verbs and proposi-
tional attitudes can be recast in a 'Partial Montague Grammar' .2 
In this paper I want to make a further contribution towards a synthesis of the existing frame-
works of formal semantics. I want to try my hand at another version of the theory of reference 
developed by Kamp and Heim. This version will be compatible with Montague' s framework and 
compatible to a large extent with my previous unification of that framework with the partiality of 
Situation Semantics. I shall make extensive use of some of the very interesting ideas that were 
developed in Groenendijk & Stokhors DMG and its predecessor Dynamic Predicate Logic 
(DPL, see Groenendijk & Stokhof [1989)). But while these systems are based on rather 
unorthodox logics,3 I simply use the (many-sorted) theory of types to model the DRT treatment 
of referentiality. Ordinary type theory is not only much simpler to use than the 'Dynamic 
lntensional Logic' that Groenendijk & Stokhof employ4 (or, for that matter, than Montague's 
IL), it is also much better understood at the metamathematical level. Logics ought not to be mul-
tiplied except from necessity. 
It turns out that the cumulative effect of this and other simplifications makes the theory admit 
of generalizations more readily. In a sequel to this paper (Muskens [to appear]) I'll show that, 
apart from the formalization of Kamp's and Heim's treatment of nominal anaphora given here, 
the essentially Reichenbachian theory of tenses that has been developed within the DRT frame-
work can be formalized in my theory. That Montague's treatment of intensionality can be incor-
porated without any complications will be shown as well. 
Our theory will be based on two assumptions and one technical insight. The first assumption 
is that meaning is compositional. The meanings of words (roughly) are the smallest building 
blocks of meaning, and meanings may combine into larger and larger structures by the rule that 
the meaning of a complex expression is given by the meanings of its parts. 
The second assumption is that meaning is computational. Texts effect change, in particular, 
texts effect changes in context. The meaning of a sentence or text can be viewed as a relation 
between context states, much in the way that the meaning of a computer program can be viewed 
as a relation between program states. 
What is a context state? Evaluation of a text may change the values of many contextual pa-
rameters: the temporal point of reference may move, the universe of discourse may grow larger 
or smaller, possible situations may become relevant or irrelevant to a particular modality, presup-
positions may spring into existence, and so on. lfwe want to keep track of all this, we must set 
up a 'conversational scoreboard' in the sense of Lewis [1979], a list of all current values of con-
2 · The partial theory of types is a simple (four-valued, Extended Strong Kleene) generalization of the usual, total, 
theory of types that we shall employ below. The setup is relational as in Orey (1959 ], not functional. The logic is 
weaker than the total logic but it shares many of the latter's model-theoretic properties. So, for example, it has the 
property of generalized completeness (validity with respect to Henkin's generalized models can be axiomatized). 
For technical information see the works mentioned. 
3 For example, in DPL an existential quantifier can bind variables that are outside of its syntactic scope .. This 
directly reflects the fact that in natural language indefinite noun phrases create discourse referents that can be picked 
up later by anaphoric pronouns not in their scope. While it may be nice to have such a close connection between 
logic and language, I consider the price that is to be paid in the form of technical complications much too high. 
4 Dynamic Intensional Logic (DIL) is due to Theo Janssen (see Janssen (1983 ]). 
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textual parameters. We may then try to study the kinematics of score, the rules that govern score 
change. On top of this, if we want to be able to interpret a text, we must have a list of all dis-
course referents active at a particular point in discourse. Texts dynamically create referents that 
can be referred to at a later instance (see Karttunen [ 1976], Heim [1982]). For example, if we 
read the short text in ( 1) then after reading its first sentence a discourse referent is set up that is 
picked up by the pronoun she1 in the second sentence. 
( l) A1 girl walked by. She1 was pretty. 
So we must keep track of two lists. One list tells us what values Lewis's components of conver-
sational score have and one tells us what value each discourse referent has at each point in dis-
course. 5 We may combine these two lists into one and call it a (context) state. 
If we were to design a computer program to keep track of the. state of discourse (as in 
Karttunen [1976]) it would be a natural choice to associate each component of conversational 
score and each discourse referent with a variable in that program. In fact, we may entertain the 
metaphor that a natural language text is a program, continually effecting the values of a long list 
of variables. Interpretation of a text continually changes the context state and the context state at 
each point in discourse in its tum effects interpretation. In much the same way a computer pro-
gram changes the values of its variables while the values of these variables effect the course the 
computation takes. 
The technical insight I referred to above is that virtually all programming concepts to be found 
in the usual imperative computer languages are available in classical type theory. We can do any 
amount of programming in type theory. This suggests that type theory is an adequate tool for 
studying how languages can program context change. Since there is also some evidence that type 
theory is a good vehicle for modelling how the meaning of a complex expression depends on the 
meaning of its parts, we may hope that it is adequate for a corn bined theory: a compositional the-
ory of the computational aspects of natural language meaning. 
The logic of programming is usually studied in a theory called dynamic logic and I'll show 
how to generalize this logic to the full theory of types in the next section. When this is done I'll 
show how to apply the resulting generalization to some phenomena that are central to Discourse 
Representation Theory in section 2. 
l. TYPE THEORY AND DYNAMIC loGIC 
Dynamic Logic (Pratt [ 1976], for an excellent survey see Harel [ 1984 ], for a transparent intro-
duction Goldblatt [ 1987]) is a logic of computation. In dynamic logic the meaning of a computer 
program is conceived of as a relation between machine states, execution of a program changes 
the state a machine is in. In an actual computer a machine state could be thought of as consisting 
of the contents of all registers and memory locations in the device at a particular moment. But in 
theory we make an abstraction and consider the abstract machines that are associated with pro-
grams. We can identify the states of such program machines with functions that assign values to 
all program variables. 
It may seem that we need more than one value for the referent that was set up by a1 girl in (1), but see the 
discussion on nondeterminism below. 
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Thus, for example, suppose we have seven variables in our program, of which u, v and w 
range over natural numbers, X and Y range over sets of natural numbers and card and boo/ 
range over playing cards and the values yes and no respectively. Then the columns in the fol-
lowing figure can be identified with machine states. 
u: 
w: 
X: 
Y: 
card: 
boo/: 
0 
0 
5 
{nl n01: 9} 
{3,14,8} 
3\' 
yes 
22 
2 
2 
{3, O} 
{nl n01:2} 
10+ 
yes 
7 22 22 
44 2 2 
7 22 22 
{5} {3, O} { 3, O} 
(b {3, O} {nln01:2} 
8+ 10+ 10+ 
no yes yes 
fig. 1 
The meaning of a given program is identified with the set of all pair8 of states (i, j) such that 
starting in state i we may end in state j after execution of that program. For example, suppose 
that our abstract machine is in state i2 and that the statement to be executed is the assignment 
w:= u. Then after execution the machine will be in state i5• The value that was assigned to u in 
i2 is now assigned to the program variable w as well. This means that the pair (i2, i5 ) is consid-
ered to be an element of the meaning of the atomic program w:= u. More generally, the mean-
ing of w := u is the set of all pairs (i, j) such that the value of w at j equals the value of u at 
i, while the values of all other program variables remain unaltered. 
Apart from programs we may also consider formulae like the identity expression u = w. 
Formulae express no relation between machine states, but are just true or false at any given state. 
For example u = w is false at states i1 and i21 but true at states i 3, i4 and i5• Consequently, the 
meaning of a formula is identified with a set of machine states. 6 
Let us consider programs and formulae that are more complex than those that consist of just 
one assignment statement or just one identity expression. The syntax of dynamic logic offers the 
following constructions: Suppose that y and 6 are programs and that A and B are formulae, 
then .L, A -+ B and [ y ]A are formulae and y ; (), y U (),A ? and y* are programs. The for-
mula .L is defined to be false at every state, A -+ B is false at a state if and only if A is true and 
B is false at that state. In Goldblatt's book we find the following other intended meanings: 
y ; {J 
y u 6 
A? 
y* 
[y]A 
do y and then {J 
do either y or 6 non-deterministically 
test A : continue if A is true, otheiwise "fail" 
repeat y some finite number(<!: 0) of times 
after every terminating execution of y, A is true 
6 Readers familiar with Discourse Representation Theory will note that the distinction between formulae and 
programs in dynamic logic mirrors the distinction between conditions and DRSs in DRT. 
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I'll discuss these constructions one by one now. The first is the sequencing of statements y ; o. 
This sequencing has a lot in common with the consecution of sentences in a text and with the be-
haviour of the word "and" in English. Ifwe start in state i2 of fig. land execute the sequential 
statement w := u ; Y := X then execution of the first part will take us to state i5 as before, 
after which an execution of the second part will bring us to i4 . Thus the pair (i2, i4 ) is an ele-
ment of the meaning of the program w:= u ; Y:= X. In general, if the meaning of program y 
is the relation Ry and the meaning of 6 is the relation Rl) then the meaning of y ; o is the set of 
all pairs (i, j) such that (i, k) E Ry and (k, j) E Rf; for some state k. The resulting relation 
is sometimes called the product of Ry and R& If both relations happen to be functions, that is if 
we are considering detenninistic programs, this product is nothing but the composition of these 
functions. 
But we do not restrict ourselves to the consideration of detenninistic programs (programs ex-
pressing functions), as the second construct, the choice, makes clear. Suppose we are in state i5, 
then execution of w := v will bring us to i2 , but execution of Y := X will bring us to i4• 
Thus execution of w:= v U Y:= X may either land us in i2 or in i4 • It follows that both 
(i5, i2 ) and (i5, i4 ) are elements of the meaning of w:= v U Y:= X. In general, the meaning 
of y U o is the union of the relations that are the meanings of y and o respectively. 
From a programming point of view it might at first blush not seem very realistic to include a 
nondetenninistic construction in the syntax: the computers that you and I have at our desks cer-
tainly operate in a deterministic way. But the allowance of nondeterminism greatly facilitates the 
study of the semantics of programming languages and computer language semanticists view de-
terministic programs as an interesting special case to which the results of their more general 
studies can be applied. In natural language nondeterminism seems to be the rule rather than the 
exception. Consider the following short text. 
(2) A1 man entered. He1 ordered a beer. 
Suppose we have a program that is designed to read and interpret texts like these (a program like 
the one in Karttunen [1976]). The program does not operate on (symbolic representations of) 
natural numbers, sets of natural numbers and cards, but on (symbolic representations of) things 
in the world, relations among these things, and so on. After reading the first sentence, the pro-
gram must have stored some man who entered in some internal store, say in v1 ; this man can 
then be picked up later as the referent ofhe1 in the second sentence. Now, which man should be 
stored in v1? This appears to be a great problem if we think of the program as embodying a de-
tenninistic automaton. Suppose that in fact both Bill and John entered, but that only John ordered 
a beer (while Bill ordered a martini). Then if the program stores Bill in v1 the text will be inter-
preted as being false, while ifJohn is stored, it will (correctly) come out true. But the program 
cannot know this in advance, that is, after processing the first sentence it has no in fonnation that 
allows it to discriminate between the two men. So, which man should be stored, the 
'indeterminate' man? This solution would seem to land us right into the middle of Mediaeval 
philosophy and into the knot of problems from which modem post-Fregean logic has freed us. 
But if we allow our program to operate nondeterministically, the problem vanishes. We can 
then let the meaning of the first sentence consist of those pairs of machine states (i, j) such that i 
is like j except that the value of v1 in j is some man who entered. In h this may be Bill, in ii it 
may be John and it may be some other man who entered in some other state (in fact, speaking 
loosely, we might say now that we have stored an 'indetenninate' man in v1 ). Some of the men 
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stored may not have ordered a beer, but states in which the value of v1 did not order a beer will 
be ruled out by (2)'s next sentence. 
How does (2)'s second sentence manage to rule out such states? This question brings us to the 
third syntactic construct of dynamic logic in the list above, the test. The meaning of a program 
A? (where A is a formula) is the set of all pairs (i, i) such that i is an element of the meaning 
of A. To see how this can be used to rule out certain possible continuations of the computation, 
consider the program (w:= v U Y:= X); u = w? and start its execution in state i5• After 
executing the choice w := v U Y := X we land in states i2 and i4 as before, but now execu-
tion of the test u = w? ensures that i 2 is ruled out. The pair (i5, i4 ) is an element of the 
meaning of the construct as a whole, but the pair (i5, i2 ) is not, and all possible continuations 
starting in i2 have now become irrelevant. In a similar way we may think of the second sentence 
in (2) as performing a test, ruling out certain possible continuations of the interpretation process. 
Thus the first three syntactic constructs in our list have a close correspondence to phenomena 
in natural language. Sequencing of programs is strongly reminiscent of the sequencing of sen-
tences in a text and of natural language conjunction generally. The nondeterminism that is intro-
duced by choice is closely connected to the indefinite character of indefinites. And tests rule out 
certain possibilities in much the same way as natural language expressions may do. 
But for the last two constructs in the list I see no direct application to natural language seman-
tics. I have merely included them for the sake of completeness and I should like to confine myself 
to stating their semantics without discussion: The meaning of an iteration y* is the reflexive 
transitive closure of the meaning of y and the meaning of a formula [ y ]A is the set of states i 
such that for all j such that (i, j) is in the meaning of y,j is in the meaning of A. 
Now suppose we want to consider natural language phenomena in the light of the dynamic 
logic sketched above and that we want to do this in the general (Montagovian) setting of Logical 
Semantics. A first problem to solve then is of a logical character. On the one hand Montague se-
mantics is based on the theory of types, on the other we want to have the main concepts of dy-
namic logic at our disposal. How can we work in type theory and use dynamic logic too? The 
solution is simple and takes the form of a translation of dynamic logic into type theory. 
We'll work with the two-sorted type theory TY 2 of Gallin [ 1975]. Essentially this is just 
Church's [1940) type theory, be it that there are three basic types, where Church uses only two. 
The basic types are e, sand t, standing for entities, states and truth.values respectively. As I 
stated above the syntactic constructs of dynamic logic can be divided into two categories: formu-
lae and programs. Formulae are true or false at a given state and thus should translate as terms of 
type st (sets of states), while programs are state changers and get type s(st) (relations between 
states}. Define the translation function t from the constructs of dynamic logic to those of type 
theory inductively by the following clauses (i, j, k and 1 are variables of type s, X is a variable 
of type st): 
(J.)f = )j l. 
(A -+ B)t =Ai (Ati-+ Bfi) 
(y; ~)t = Aij.Elk(yfik /\. ~t kj) 
(y u l>)t = Aij(yt ij v M ij) 
(A ?)t = Aij(Afi /\. j = i) 
{y*)t = Aij VX((Xi /\. Vkl((Xk /\. ytkl)-+ XJ)-+ Xj) 
([y]A )t =Ai Vj(ytij--+ Atj) 
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The clauses here closely follow the discussion of dynamic logic given above. We see that the 
translation of J_ is the empty set of states, that A -+ B translates as the set of states at which ei-
ther the translation of A is false or the translation of B is true, that the meaning of y ; {j is given 
as the product of the meanings of y and 6, that the meaning of y U {j is the union of the mean-
ings of its components and that the meaning of a test A ? is given as the set of all pairs (i, i) 
such that A is true at i. The translations of y* and of [ y ]A are again listed for the sake of com-
pleteness only. The first gives the reflexive transitive closure of the meaning of y by means of a 
second order quantification;7 the second treats [ y] essentially as a modal operator with an acces-
sibility relation given by y. 
This translation embeds the propositional part of dynamic logic into type theory, the part that 
contains no variables (or quantification) and hence no assignment statements. But we do want to 
study how assignments are being made, for it seems that language has a capacity to update the 
components of conversational score in a way reminiscent of the updating of variables in a pro-
gram. So let us return to our discussion of states, variables and assignment statements now. 
The reader may have noted a contradiction between our treatment of states as primitive objects 
and our earlier declaration that states are functions from program variables to the possible values 
of these variables. We could try to remove this contradiction by taking states to be objects of 
some complex type a{3, where a is the type of variables and f3 is the type of their values. But 
this plan fails, for in general there is no single type of variables and no single type of the values 
of variables. Programming languages can handle variables ranging over many different data types 
and human languages seem to be capable of storing many different sorts of things as items of 
conversational score. It seems that we have a problem here. Was it caused by an all too strict ad-
herence to a typed system? 
There is an ingenious little trick due to Theo Janssen [ 1983] that he.lps us out: Janssen simply 
observed that we may go on treating states as primitive if we treat program variables as functions 
from states to values. That is, we may shift our attention from the columns in figure 1 to the 
rows, and instead of viewing (say) i2 as the function that assigns the number 22 to u, the num-
ber 2 to v, the set {n In<!:: 2} to Y, the card 10+ to card and so on, we may view (say) was 
the function assigning the number 5 to ii, the number 2 to i2, the number 7 to h etcetera. This 
procedure is clearly equivalent to the older one and it saves us from the type clash we encoun-
tered above. 
This means that we can regard states as inhabitants of our typed domains and the same holds 
for the things that are denoted by program variables. States all live in the same basic domain Ds, 
while the denotations of program variables may live in different domains. For example, if n is 
the type of natural numbers then the denotation of u in figure 1 lives in Dsm but the denotation 
of X lives in Ds(nt )· A program variable that has values of type a is a function of type sa it-
self. 
Treating states as primitive and treating program variables as functions from states to values 
thus allows us to have many different types of things that can be stored as the value of a variable 
at a certain state. But now that we have assured ourselves of this possibility we shall refrain from 
using it. For reasons of exposition we shall allow only type e objects to be values of program 
variables and program variables consequently will have type se. In a sequel to this paper 
(Muskens [to appear]), however, we'll make a more extensive use of .our possibilities and there 
7 The treatment of iteration improves upon the results in Janssen [1983). A treatment of recursion in the typed 
models of classical higher order logic is given in Muskens [in preparation]. 
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the theory will be generalized so that we can have any finite number of types of program vari-
ables. 
We should, by the way, remove a possible source of confusion. We are treating the denota-
tions of program variables as objects in our ontology. Objects can be referred to in two ways, by 
means of constants or by means of variables, and there is no reason to make an exception for ob-
jects of type se. In view of this, the term program variable is perhaps less than felicitous and I 
want to change terminology now. Referring to the object I shall from now on use the tenn store, 
a constant denoting a store is a store name and a (logical) variable ranging over stores a store 
variable. 8 I take it that the syntactic objects that are usually called program variables are in fact 
store names, not store variables. Stores are functions, and of course the values of a function 
may vary in the sense that a function may assign different values to different arguments. 
What effect does the execution of an assignment statement v := u have on a state? It changes 
the value of the store named by v to the value of the store named by u, but it leaves all other 
stores as they are. Consequently, if we write i[ v ]j for "states i and j agree in all stores, except 
possibly in the store (named by) v ", the following should be our translation of the assignment 
statement into type logic. 
(v := u)f = A.ij(i[v]j A vj = ui) 
The intuitive meaning of the formula i [ v ]j A vj = ui is that i and j agree in all stores, except 
possibly in store v and that the value of store v in j is identical to the value of store u in i. 
In order to make this really work two conditions must be fulfilled. The first of these is that the 
expression i[ v ]j really means what we want it to mean. This we can ensure by letting i [ v )j be 
an abbreviation of Vu5e((STu A u *' v)-+ uj = ui), where ST is a non-logical constant of 
type (se )t with the intuitive interpretation "is a store". The second condition that is to be fulfilled 
if we want our treatment of assignments to be correct, is that for each i there really is a j in the 
model such that i[ v ]j A vj = ui. Until now there is nothing that guarantees this. For example, 
some of our typed models may have only one state in their domain D5 • In models that do not 
have enough states an attempt to update a store may fail; we want to rule out such models. In 
fact, we want to make sure that we can always update a store selectively with each appropriate 
value we may like to. This we can do by means of the following axiom. 
AXl ViVvse Vxe(STv -+ .Eq(i[ v ]j A vj = x )) 
This makes sure that an assignment is always possible by postulating that the required state al-
ways exists. The axiom scheme is closely connected with Goldblatt's [ 1987, pp. 102] require-
ment of 'Having Enough States' and with Janssen's 'Update Postulate'. We'll refer to it as the 
Update Axiom. It follows from the axiom that not all type se functions are stores (except in the 
marginal case that De contains only one element), since, for example, a constant function that 
assigns the same value to all states cannot be updated to another value. The Update Axiom im-
poses the condition that contents of stores may be varied at will. 
Of course store names should refer to stores and that is just what the following axiom scheme 
requires. 
8 This is the official position. Once the basic confusion is removed there seems to be no harm in some happy 
sinning against strict usage. 
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AX2 STv for each store name v 
The combined effect of these axioms and the definition of i[ v ]j now guarantees that assignment 
statements always get the interpretation that is desired. 
There is one more axiom scheme that we shall need, an axiom scheme that is completely rea-
sonable from a programming point of view: although different stores may have the same value at 
a given state, we don't want two different store names to refer to the same store. An assignment 
v := u should not result in an update of w simply because v and w happen to be names for the 
same store and from i[ v ]j we want to be able to conclude that ui = uj if u and v are different 
store names. This we enforce simply by demanding 
AX3 u >I< v for each two syntactically different store names u andv 
This ends our discussion of the assignment statement and it ends our discussion of the more gen-
eral part of the theory. All programming concepts that are needed in the rest of the paper have 
been introduced now. Essentially we have shown how to treat the class of so-called while pro-
grams in Montague Grammar.9 Since every computable function can be implemented with the 
help of a while program this means that we can do any amount of programming in classical type 
theory. 
2. NOMINALANAPHORA 
In this section I'll define a little Montague fragment of English, treating anaphora in the way of 
Kamp [ 1981] and Heim [ 1982]. The result can be viewed as a direct generalization of 
Groenendijk & Stokhof s system of 'Dynamic Predicate Logic' (Groenendijk & Stokhof [ 1989]) 
to the theory of types.10 The fragment will be based on a system of categories that is defined in 
the following manner. 
i. Sand E are categories; 
ii. If A and B are categories, then A /n B is a category (n ~ J ). 
Here S is the category of sentences (and texts). The category E does not itself correspond to any 
class of English expressions, but it is used to build up complex categories that do correspond to 
such classes. The notation /n stands for a sequence of n slashes. I'll employ some familiar ab-
breviations for category notations, writing 
VP (verb phrase) for S/E, 
N (common noun phrase) for S//E, 
NP (noun phrase) for S/VP, 
TV (transitive verb phrase) for VP/NP, and 
DET (determiner) for NP/N. 
9 The statement while A do a can be defined as (A?; a)*; ..,A?. 
10 In fact the present system is closer to DPL than Groenendijk & Stokhof's own generalization, DMG, is. 
Roughly, what Groenendijk & Stokhof do on the metalevel of DPL I do on the object level of type theory. 
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The analogy that we have noted between programs and texts motivates us to treat sentences, and 
indeed texts, as relations between states, objects of type s (st), just like programs. The category 
E we associate with type e. More generally, we define a correspondence between types and 
Montague's categories as follows. 
i. TYP(S) = s(st); TYP(E) = e; 
ii. TYP(A/nB) = (TYP(B),TYP(A)) 
The idea is that an expression of category A is associated with an object of type TYP(A) and 
that an expression that seeks an expression of category B in order to combine with it into an ex-
pression of category A is associated with a function from TYP(B) objects to TYP(A) objects, 
or, equivalently, with a (TYP(B),TYP(A)) object. 
To improve readability let's abbreviate our notation for types somewhat and let's write 
[ a1 ••• an] instead of ( a1 (a2 ( ••• an (s(st )) ... ). Under this convention, the rule above as-
signs the types listed in the second column of the table below to the categories listed in its first 
column. 
Category Type 
VP [e] 
N [e] 
NP [[e]] 
1V [[[e]]e] 
DET [[e][e]] 
(N/N)/VP [[e][e]e] 
(S/S)/S [[][]] 
(S/S)//S [[][]] 
Some basic expressions 
walk, talk 
farmer, donkey, man, woman, bastard 
Pedron. Johnn, itn, hen, shen (n ;;;: 1) 
own, beat, love 
an. everyn, then, non (n ;;;: 1) 
who 
and, or, . (the stop) 
if 
Some basic expressions belonging to these categories I have listed in the third column. From 
these the complex expressions of our fragment are built. An expression of category A/n B will 
combine with an expression of category B and the result will be an expression of category A. 
For example, the word an of category DET (defined as NP/ N) combines with the word 
farmer of category N to the phrase an farmer, which belongs to the category NP. The exact 
nature of the way expressions are combined need hardly concern us here. Mostly, combination is 
just concatenation, but some syntactic fine-tuning is needed in order to take care of things like 
word order and agreement. 
Determiners, proper names and pronouns are indexed, as the reader will have noticed. As 
usual, coindexing is meant to indicate the relation between a dependent (for example an anaphoric 
pronoun) and its antecedent. So in the short text 
(3) A 1 farmer owns a2 donkey. The1 bastard beats it2 
the coindexing indicates that the bastard depends on a farmer and that it depends on a don-
key. In this paper we study only the semantic aspects of the dependent I antecedent relation, but 
our considerations should be supplemented with a syntactic theory of the same relation, such as 
the Binding Theory (see e.g. Reinhart [1979], Bach & Partee [1981)). The Binding Theory rules 
out certain coindexings that are logically possible but syntactically impossible. Our version of 
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Dynamic Montague Grammar is designed to answer the question how in a syntactically accept-
able text a dependent manages to pick up a referent that was introduced by its antecedent; so we 
may restrict ourselves to the study of texts that are coindexed in a syntactically correct way. 
In order to provide our little fragment of English with an interpretation we shall translate it into 
type theory. Expressions of a category A will be translated into tenns of type TYP (A ). The 
translation of an expression, or, to be precise, the set of tenns that are equivalent (given the ax-
ioms) with the translation of an expression, we identify with its meaning. Thus we can make 
predictions about the semantic behaviour of expressions on the basis of the logical behaviour of 
their translations. The function that assigns translations to expressions is defined as usual, rule-
to-rule, inductively, by specifying (a) the translations of basic expressions and (b) how the 
translation of a complex expression depends on the translations of its parts. 
To start with (b), our rule for combining the translation of a category A/n B expression with 
the translation of an expression of category B is always functional application. That is, if a is a 
translation of the expression .[ of category A /n B and if ( translates the expression 3 of 
category B, then the translation of the result of combining .[ and S is the term o(. 
Translations ofbasic expressions, to continue with (a), can be specified by simply listing them 
and this I'll do now. A detailed explanation will be given shortly.' I 
an 
non 
everyn 
then 
Pedron 
hen 
if 
and 
or 
who 
farmer 
walk 
love 
_,.. 
._,,. 
._,,. 
._,,. 
._,,. 
_,.. 
""" 
.,,.. 
_,.. 
_,.. 
_,.. 
""' 
._,,. 
""' 
AP1P2i..ij!Ikh(i[vn ]k /\ P1(vnk)kh /\ P2(vnk)hj) 
A.P1P2?t.ij(i = j f\-,3khl(i[vn]k /\ P1(vnk)kh /\ P2(vnk)hl)) 
A.P1P2?t.ij(i = j /\ Vkl ((i[ vn ]k /\ P1( vnk )kl)-+ !Ih P2( v~ )Jh)) 
A.P1P2?t.ij!Ik(P1 ( vnk )ik /\ P2( v~ )kj) 
).PAij(vJ = pedro /\ P(vni)ij) 
A.PAij(P( vni)ij) 
A.pqMj(i = j /\ Vh(pih -+ 3k qhk)) 
).pqli.ijHh (pih I\ qhj) 
).pqli.ijHh (pih I\ qhj) 
). pq). ij (i = j /\ !Ih (pih v qih)) 
).P1P2?i.xli.ijHh (P2xih A P1xhj) 
AxAij(farmer x /\ i = j) 
).x).ij (walk x I\ i = j) 
).Q).y( QA.xli.ij(Iove xy /\ i = j)) 
In these translations we let h, i,j, k and 1 be types variables; x and y are type e variables; 
(subscripted) Pisa variable of type TYP( VP); Q a variable of type TYP(NP); p and q are 
variables of type s (st ); pedro is a constant of type e; farmer and walk are type et constants; 
Jove is a constant of type e(et) and each vn is a store name. 
To grasp how things work one is advised to make a few translations and by way of example 
I'll work out some translations in detail, making comments as I go along. I'll start with text (3). 
(3) At farmer owns a2 donkey. The1 bastard beats it2 
1 1 Not all basic expressions given in the table above can be found in this list but for each item in the table an 
example is listed. So, e.g., the translation of own will be analogous to that of love, the translation of itn will 
be analogous (and in fact identical) to that of hen. 
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The combination a1 farmer is translated by the translation of at applied to the translation of 
farmer. Some lambda-conversions reduce this to 
and by predicate logic this is equivalent to 
In a completely analogous way we find that a2 donkey translates as 
(6) Jo.P}.ij!Jk(i[v2 ]k A donkey(v}c) A P(v}c)kj). 
And from this we derive that own a2 donkey has a translation equivalent to 
(7) Jo.yXij(i[v2 ]j A donkey(v2 j) A own(v2 j)y), 
so that for a 1 farmer owns a2 donkey we find 
Thus far everything was lambda-conversion and ordinary logic; but now we come to a reduction 
that is specific to our system. First, using the definition of k[ v2 ]j (and AX3), note that the term 
above is equivalent to 
(9) Jo.ij!Jk(i[v1 ]k A farmer(vJi) 11 k[v2 ]j A donkey(vJ)A own(v2 j)(vd)). 
Now let us write i[ VJ, v2 ]j for !Jk(i[ v1 ]k /\ k[ v2 ]j). Then our term reduces to 
A moment's reflection and an application of the Update Axiom learns us that i[ v1 , v2 )j means 
'states i and j agree in all stores except possibly in v1 and v2 '. Since this new notation will 
prove useful on many occasions we may generalize it somewhat. Let ui, ... , Un be store names, 
then by induction i [ u 1, ••• , Un ]j is defined to abbreviate .'lk (i [ u i] k A k [ U2, ••• , Un )j ). 
Again, by the Update Axiom the formula i[u1, ••• , un]j means: 'states i and j agree in all 
stores except possibly in u J, ••• , Un '. 
The upshot of the translation process thus far is that we have associated a certain relation be-
tween context states with the sentence a 1 farmer owns a2 donkey. The relation in question 
holds between states i and j if these states differ in maximally two of their stores, v1 and vi, 
and if the values of these stores in j are a farmer and a donkey that he owns respectively. In fact 
the sentence a1 farmer owns a2 donkey now has aspects that we find in assignment state-
ments in a programming language: it assigns a farmer to v1 and a donkey to v2 and imposes the 
further constraint that the farmer owns the donkey. Of course the assignment is nondeterministic: 
there may be more than one farmer and one donkey in the model that satisfy the description, or 
there may be none. 
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Let's continue our translation. By a procedure that is now entirely familiar we find that the1 
bastard beats if 2 translates as 
This means that the sentence functions as a test: it denotes the set of all pairs (i, i) such that the 
value of store v1 at i is a bastard that beats the value of store v2. 
We can now combine the two sentences. Sentence concatenation is symbolized with the full 
stop, which is assigned category ( S / S) / S; its meaning is A.pqAij3h (pih A qhj): sequencing. 
Applying this first to ( 1 O) and then applying the result to ( 11) gives the translation of (3). 
(12) J.ij(i[ v1 , v2 ] j A fanner( vd) A donkey( v2 j) A own( v2 j)( vd) 
A bastard( v1j) A beat( v2 j)( vd)). 
We see that the relation expressed by (10) is now restricted properly by the test in (11). 
Moreover, we see that the discourse referents that were created by the antecedents ar farmer 
and a2 donkey in the first sentence of(3) are now picked up by the dependents the1 bastard 
and it2. 
The relation in (12) gives the meaning of text (3), but to get at the truth conditions one further 
step is needed. We say that a text is true in a context state i (in some model) if there is some 
context state j such that (i, j) is in the denotation of the meaning of the text. If R is the meaning 
of some text then we call its domain ME!j Rij, the set of all states in which the text is true, its 
content. The step from meaning to truth parallels a similar step taken in DRT: a discourse repre-
sentation structure is true if it has a verifying embedding. 
Clearly the content of (3) is 
(13) M3} (i[ vu v2 ] j A fanner( v1 j) A donkey( v2j) A own( v2 j)( vd) 
A bastard( vd) A beat( v2 j)( vd)). 
But this can be simplified considerably, for it is equivalent to ( 14). Quantifying over a state has 
the effect of binding unselectively the contents of all stores in that state. 
(14) Af!Ixy( 18.nner x A donkey y I\ own yx A bastard x A beat yx). 
To show the equivalence, we may abbreviate the conjunction farmer x A donkey y I\ own yx A 
bastard x A beat yx as rp for the moment. Suppose (13) holds for some i. Then there are ob-
jects, namely the values of vd and v2 j, that satisfy rp. It follows that (14) is true in i. 
Conversely, suppose that ( 14) is true for some i. Then there are d1 and d2 that satisfy rp. By the 
Update Axiom there is a j, differing from i at most in stores v1 and v2 , such that v1 j = d1 
and v2j = d2. Hence .fU(i( v1, v2 ]j A [ v1 j/ x, v2j/y ]rp) holds, so. that (13) is true in i. 
The principle underlying the equivalence of (13) and (14) is important enough to state it in full 
generality. I call it the Unselective Binding Lemma. 
UN SELECTIVE BINDING LEMMA. Let u 1, ••• , Un be store names, let x1, ••• , Xn be distinct 
variables, let ep be a formula that does not contain j and let [uJ/x1, ••• , urJ/xn ]rp stand for 
the simultaneous substitution of uJ for x1 and ... and ud for Xn in rp, then: 
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(i) Hj(i[ub··· ,Un]j A [uJ/xi.··· ,aj'/xnl<I') isequivalentwith 
Elx1 ••• Xn (/) 
(ii) Vj (i [ u J. • • • , Un li -+ [ u Li/ X1i . . . , aj' / Xn ] (/)) is equivalent with 
Vx1 ... Xn (/) 
I omit the proof of this lemma since it is an obvious generalization of the proof of the equivalence 
of (13) and (14) given above {(ii) follows from (i) of course). 
We see that (3) is true in a context state if and only if it is true in all other context states, the 
content of (3) either denotes the empty set or the set of all states, depending on whether there is a 
farmer who owns a donkey in the model and whether the bastard beats it. But this does not hold 
for all texts; let's consider sentence ( 15) for instance. 
(15) He1 beats a2 donkey 
The pronoun he1 cannot be interpreted as dependent on some antecedent provided by the text in 
this case. And so it must be interpreted deictically, its referent must be provided by the context. 
Now let us look at the meaning and the content of ( 15), given in ( 16) and ( 17) respectively. 
(16) ..1.ij(i[v2 ]j /\ donkey(v2 j) A beat (v2 j)(v1i)) 
(17) Ai£lx(donkeyx /\beat x (v1i)) 
We see that ( 15) is true only in contexts that provide a referent for the deictic pronoun he1. The 
reader may wish to verify that texts containing a proper name or a definite noun phrase that lacks 
an antecedent are treated likewise. 
If a text contains an indefinite right at the start, the discourse referent created by that indefinite 
will live through the entire text and can be picked up by a dependent at any point. But some dis-
course referents have only a limited life span. In order to see how our system can account for 
this, let's work out the translation of the following celebrated example. 
(18) Every1 farmer who owns '32 donkey beats it2 
First we apply the translation of who, J..P1P2..1xAijflh (PiXih /\ P1xhj), which gives a general-
ized form of conjunction, to the VP own a2 donkey. The result, after conversions, is 
(19) ..1.PAxAij!Jh(Pxih A h[v2 )j A donkey(v2 j) /\ own(v2j)x). 
Applying this to the translation of farmer results in 
(20) ..1.x..1.ij (Fanner x A i[ v2 )j /\ donkey( v2 j) /\ own( v2 j)x ), 
the translation of farmer who owns a2 donkey. Next we combine this result with the transla-
tion of the determiner every,. This gives the following terrn: 
(21) ..1.PAij (i = j /\ VJ ((i [ V1 ' V2] 1 A fanner( V1 J) A donkey ( V2 J) 
/\ own(v2 J)(v11))-+ !IhP(v1k)Jh)). 
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Finally a combination with the VP beat "2 yields: 
(22) Ji.ij(i = j A VJ((i[v1 , v2 ]1 A fanner(v1 J) A donkey(v2 1) 
A own( V21)( V1 J))-+ beat ( V2 l)( Vi I)), 
which by the Unselective Binding Lemma is equivalent to 
(23) Ji.ij(i=j A Vxy((farmerx/\donkeyyAownyx)-+ beatyx)). 
The translation of a universal sentence thus acts as a test; it cannot change the value of any store 
but can only serve to rule out certain continuations of the interpretation process. The discourse 
referents that were introduced by the determiners every1 and a2 had a limited life span. Their 
role was essential in obtaining the correct translation of the sentence, but once this translation was 
obtained they died and could no longer be accessed. There are more operators that behave in the 
way of everyn in this respect: in the fragment under consideration the determiner non , and the 
words if and or have a very similar behaviour. 
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